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Irregular Migration / Asylum Management in a Volatile Geopolitical Context 
Greece has been characterised by relatively 
high irregular migrant population stocks and 
flows during the past 25 years. Of particular 
concern have been the Greek Turkish land and 
sea borders that bear the brunt of irregular 
migration and asylum seeking pressures from 
neighbouring and far away Asian and African 
countries.  
Migration and asylum pressures at Greece’s and 
the EU’s external borders are strongly 
influenced by geopolitical developments in the 
region since the Arab spring in 2011 and 
particularly the implosion of the Libyan regime, 
the conflict in Syria as well as overall instability 
and conflict in the Middle East. Arrivals at the 
Greek Turkish sea borders had peaked in 2008-
2009 but are dramatically rising again during 
2014. The Greek Turkish land border by contrast 
was heavily under pressure in 2010-2011 but has 
now largely been abandoned.   
 
Chart 1: Evolution of Flows along the Greek Turkish Borders 2008- 2014 (Aug.) 
 
 
Note: data refer to apprehensions, not to people. Hence the same person if apprehended twice counts twice. Emphasis is 
added by the authors to signal peaks of apprehensions at different borders. Source: Greek police data, www.astynomia.gr 
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The flows are mixed in terms of composition; 
young men but also families and unaccompanied 
children, people who flee war and political 
unrest as well as people migrating mainly for 
economic reasons. Syrians have emerged as the 
largest nationality group arriving at the Greek 
Turkish border in 2013-2014 while Afghans 
occupied the top position in 2011-2012. 
Pakistanis have consistently been among the 5 
largest nationality groups but their numbers 
have sharply declined from nearly 20,000 in 
2011 to approx. 2,000 in 2014. 
Sadly, Greece has hit the headlines for illegal 
pushbacks of small vessels in the Aegean, and 
overnight refoulements across the Evros river, 
but also for grimy detention centers and 
violence that went unpunished (see ProAsyl 
2007; Human Rights Watch 2009; MSF 2014; 




Chart 2: Top 5 Nationality Groups as regards Apprehensions at the Borders, 2009-2014 (Aug.) 
 
 
Source: Ministry for the Protection of the Citizen, www.astynomia.gr for all years cited here.  
Financing Irregular Migration Controls 
The management of irregular arrivals is 
combined with the particularly heavy burden of 
the financial crisis. As a result, Greece has had 
to rely extensively on EU funds, in order to 
implement its migration control policy.  
The authorities have at times provided figures, 
such as the recent announcement the Ministry 
of Marine that sea patrols in the Aegean cost 63 
million euros in 2013. Yet in the absence of a 
systematic assessment of the cost effectiveness 
of the policies, such figures are of little use.  
A closer look at the distribution of resources 
raises also important questions: On one hand, 
Greece has trouble financially sustaining an 
effective asylum system.  During its first year 
of operation (2013-2014) the new Asylum 
Service has had to also rely on voluntary work 
and assistance by UNHCR to cover its needs for 
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interpreters. Greece has also been unable to 
run adequate shelters for migrant children, as a 
result of which many are left to survive in 
destitution and homelessness.  
On the other hand, 5 million were set aside to 
erect a 10-km fence along the Greek-Turkish 
border. Resources were also found to cover the 
running costs of Amygdaleza pre-removal 
center, an 'exemplary' detention facility which 
costs 10.5 million per year. 
Aims of this policy paper 
Questions indeed arise as to the overall 
efficiency of Greece’s irregular migration 
control and asylum management as well as to 
the cost-effectiveness of the policies 
implemented. This policy paper assesses the 
human and material resources invested in the 
management of irregular migration within the 
timeframe of 2008-2013, answering three 
questions: 
How much do irregular migration control 
policies in Greece actually cost? 
Are current policies cost-effective, when 
compared against their outputs and outcomes? 
Are there any alternative policy 
recommendations that could be more cost-
effective? 
The MIDAS project gathered and brought 
together a wide range of data that has been 
hitherto unknown thus making an important 
contribution to the policy and political debate. 
In terms of policy analysis, our ambition in this 
paper is modest. We do not go as far as 
challenging Greece's, and consequently the EU's 
policy objectives altogether but rather accept 
the current policy objectives as granted and 
review the manner in which the authorities seek 
to achieve them. The MIDAS project solely 
explores the financial dimension of the Greek 
migration policy and seeks to put forward policy 
recommendations in line with international 
human rights law that will benefit both migrants 
and the host society. 
Methodology 
MIDAS is a 10-month project carried out by the 
ELIAMEP Migration Team between January-
October 2014. In the absence of previous studies 
on the cost-effectiveness of Greece' migration 
policy, much time and energy was spent to 
gather information that lied by large in a 
fragmented manner or was simply unavailable. 
Once all main funding schemes of Greece's 
migration policy had been identified, we 
contacted all of Greece's main sponsors to 
gather the necessary data and discussed the 
data with key stakeholders.  
We worked primarily on the basis of written 
requests for information, in order to secure the 
accuracy of the figures provided. These were 
normally divided as follows: (a) cataloguing (list 
of operations/measures undertaken in the 
period 2008-2013), (b) costs (human and 
material resources deployed, expenditures), 
(c)direct outputs and outcomes (statistics on 
detainees, asylum claims, returns, 
apprehensions) and (d) evaluation (questions 
addressing effectiveness of measures against 
costs and in the overall Greek context). On 
many occasions our initial requests were 
followed up by further clarifications, either 
because not all questions had been answered, 
or because there was a need for further 
clarification of the data provided.  
In addition to fieldwork, an extended overview 
of primary sources was undertaken:  
Parliamentary questions, Greece's annual 
reports before the European Refugee Fund, the 
European Return Fund and the External Borders 
Fund, Frontex' financial reports, the EEA Grants 
Memorandum and other EU documents.
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Greece’s Migration Control Policy Objectives 
In the context of Greece's irregular migration 
management during the period 2008-2013, both 
practice and political promulgations agree that 
the ultimate goal has been one: to 'clear' the 
country from its irregular migrant population. 
On this basis, the Greek authorities designed 
their policies along two main intertwined 
objectives: deterrence and return. To achieve 
this objective, Greece designed a three-pillar 
policy they may be best described as follows: 
Figure 1: Greece's Irregular Migration Strategy 
 
 “What is happening this moment, is that everybody who gets arrested will be detained. They no longer 
have the choice to live on the streets. They will be detained and deported. If they opt for voluntary 
return.” 
Skai TV Channel, 6 August 2012, Abstracts of Interview with the Minister of Citizen Protection, our translation) 
 
Even though in 2010 Greece designed a National 
Action plan, which was revised in 2013, that 
foresaw a series of reception and integration 
policies and objectives in the context of asylum 
and migration management, these were not 
prioritised during the period 2008-2013. Both in 
terms of resource distribution and 
implementation pace, most of these measures 
are still in the making or in search for funding.  
In terms of short- and long-term objectives, 
Greece's policy approach sought to achieve both 
objectives of deterrence and return in an 
integrated manner.  
In the short term,  
• border management aimed primarily at 
stopping migrants from entering the 
country.  
• Apprehensions at the borders and the 
interior aimed at detecting trespassers 
with a view to immediately return 
them.  
• Detention is a tool aimed at enhancing 
returns.  
In the long term, the aim of the whole 
strategy was to persuade migrants to avoid 
Greece altogether. 
  5 
 
Sponsors and Costs 
In the period 2008-2013, Greece's asylum and 
irregular migration control policy entailed 
expenditures of at least half a billion euros. 
Greece’s policy was covered at a 75%-100% rate 
by four main external sponsors:  
 
• European Commission (SOLID 
Framework) 
• Frontex 
• Norway, Liechtenstein, Iceland in 
agreement with the European 
Commission (EEA Grants Framework) 
Figure 2: Main Sources of Funding of Greek Irregular Migration Control and Asylum Policy 
 
 
Overall Cost Assessment 
During the period 2008-2013, Greece received in 
terms of direct grants a minimum total of 432 
million euros. In terms of indirect financial 
contributions the sums become higher. The 
overall cost to manage the irregular migrant 
population within these funding schemes, cost 
Greece and all its main sponsors (EU, Frontex, 
EEA) a minimum of half a billion euros, out of 
which 15% went into the asylum system, 27% in 
return policies and 55% in external border 
management.  
The emphasis is placed on ‘minimum’, since 
additional sums allocated from the national 
budget are not always known or not easy to 
calculate. For instance, the Ministry of Marine 
and Mercantile announced recently that it spent 
in 2013 an estimate of 63 million euros, in order 
to safeguard the East Aegean Sea. As regards 
Greek Police, however, an analogous estimate 
would be difficult, if not impossible, as tasks 
related to daily controls in public places and 
arrest-and-detain measures in the streets of 
major cities, have in recent years been 
integrated into the regular duties of police 
officers. Likewise, NGO voluntary work is not 
reflected in the above-described figures, as it 
would be difficult to estimate in monetary 
terms. 
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This policy paper investigates two areas: 
migration controls at the border and in the 
mainland, and detention, with a view to 
assessing the specific policy choices, strategy 
and cost effectiveness of Greece’s irregular 
migration policy. 
Migration Controls 
In the period 2008-2013 Greece's policy to 
tackle irregular migration clearly prioritised 
measures of border policing and arrest. 
Detection and arrest were thereby viewed as 
the first step to a successful migration policy, 
the primary purpose of which was to reduce the 
irregular migrant population. Not only was most 
funding absorbed in this area, but Greece 
delved deep into its national resources, in order 
to secure their speedy completion.  
Particularly since 2012, the Greek authorities 
followed two major courses of actions: first, 
they reinforced the Greek-Turkish land border, 
which was at the time the main entry point of 
irregular migrants into the Greek territory; 
second, they sought to ‘clear up’ the interior of 
Greece from all migrants staying irregularly in 
the country. The afore-mentioned included the 
erection of a technical fence along the Greek 
Turkish border and launch of Operation Shield in 
the region; in the interior, Operation Xenios 
Zeus started, which was a ‘stop and search’ 
policy, targeting irregular migrants. 
 
 Fencing the Border 
The idea to construct a physical barrier along 
the 206-kilomener land border with Turkey 
analogous to the fence between the US-Mexico 
border was first announced by the Ministry of 
Citizen Protection in January 2011, at a time 
when Frontex's Operation Rabit was nearing its 
end.  
While Greece and Turkey were naturally 
separated by the Evros river, there is a 10km 
land strip through which migrants can cross by 
land. This had become an increasingly popular 
entry point. Erecting a fence, according to the 
Greek government, would not only give a final 
solution to the continuous influx of irregular 
migrants through the region, but also have a 
fundamentally 'symbolic' value; it would send 
out the message that Greece was taking its 
border management seriously. The construction 
of the fence started in October 2011 and was 
completed by December 2012. The initial 
proposal foresaw the construction of a 12.5 km 
fence at an estimated cost of 4.8 million euros, 
later raised to 5.5 million euros.  
An early attempt to draw funding from the 
External Borders Fund was rejected by the 
European Commission. The final construction is 
10,365 metres long and runs along the north-
eastern side of the Greek-Turkish borders, 
between the villages of Kastanies and Nea 
Vyssa. It consists of two cement walls with 
barbed wire in between and has an average 
height of 3m. It runs exclusively on Greek soil 
and is alleged to be at its closest only one 
meter away from the Turkish border. 
In terms of cost, a private company undertook 
the erection of the fence at a price of 3.16 
million euros, paid exclusively by national 
resources. 
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Figure 3: Design of the Fence at the Greek Turkish Land Border 
 
Human Resources for Border Control: Operation Shield (Aspida) 
Three months before the completion of the 
Evros fence, Operation Shield (Aspida) was 
launched. Its main purpose was to control and 
deter irregular arrivals by reinforcing the 
physical presence of patrol officers at the 
Greek-Turkish land border. Between August 2012 
and February 2013, nearly 1,900 police officers 
were deployed along the border. Contrary to the 
Evros fence, which covered only a 5% of the 
overall land border between Greece and Turkey, 
Operation Shield was spread along the 206 km 
river line. While most officers were assigned 
border management duties, part of the staff 
were assigned reception and screening duties, 
including asylum management and informing 
irregular immigrants about their rights. Upon 
completion of the first phase, Operation Shield 
was extended until June 2013 and has since 
continued. 
The initial phase, lasting 6 months, cost a total 
of 16 million euros. Its 5-month extension until 
June 2013 cost a further 8 million euros, raising 
thus the total cost to 24 million euros. As the 
number of irregular migrants entering through 
the specific land strip decreased, the number of 
police officers was subsequently reduced to a 
half. To cover the costs, Greece drew funding at 
75% from the External Borders fund as well as 
its own national resources. While the salaries of 
the police officers were borne by the Greek 
State, functional expenditures (tanker truck 
vehicles, fuel, operational uniforms, special 
camouflage tents) were co-financed by the 
External Borders Fund.  
During the period 2010-2012, the overall cost of 
border control at the Greek Turkish land border 
is estimated at 67 million euros taken from 
both EU and national resources. 
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 Chart 3. Known Costs of Border Control Greek-Turkish Land Borders, 2010-2012 
 
Source Item Cost 
External Borders Fund 








National Resources Evros fence 3.1. million 
TOTAL  67 million 
*hosted by Greece and Bulgaria 
Assessing the Cost-Effectiveness of Border Controls in Overall Reducing Arrivals 
and Irregular Migration Pressures 
If we assess the effectiveness of these measures 
in terms of absolute numbers, then this was 
indeed an effective policy, as it drastically 
reduced the number of irregular arrivals through 
the specific land strip.  
If we assess the effectiveness of this policy in 
relative numbers, then it appears lesser, 
because the reduction in arrivals through the 
land border was accompanied with a parallel 
rise in entries through the Greek Turkish sea 
border. While the increase was moderate in 
2012-2013, it has dramatically gone up in 2014. 
Indeed the fence seems to have re-routed the 
flows rather than having drastically reduced 
them altogether. Erecting a wall and investing in 
particular entry points, can be effective in 
reducing entries and pressures through that 
specific gate but pressure and arrivals are 




If Greece's primary policy objective is to reduce its irregular migrant population by deterring irregular 
arrivals, then there are also alternative tools available such as awareness-raising campaigns with a view 
to stopping migrants before they start the journey. For instance, Greece can appoint migration officers 
at diplomatic services abroad and distribute through NGOs both in Greece and abroad film 
documentaries. There is often little awareness among prospective irregular migrants that they can 
hardly hope to regularise their stay and legitimately work in Europe.  
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Controls within the Country: Operation Xenios Zeus 
Operation Xenios Zeus was launched almost 
simultaneously with Operation Shield aiming at 
matching border controls with enforcement at 
the interior. At the time it was estimated that 1 
out of 4 migrants residing in Greece was on an 
irregular status. Operation 'Xenios Zeus' began 
on 2 August 2012. On 16 July 2014 it was 
incorporated into the standard police 
procedures and patrols and re-named into 
Operation 'Theseus'.  
Operation Xenios Zeus comprised a series of 
regular round-up operations carried out in areas 
with a high concentration of irregular migrants, 
including street and house searches. It was 
impressive both in terms of geographic coverage 
(three major cities) and intensity (initially on a 
daily basis, every person who looked ‘foreign’ 
was stopped and checked). 
Approximately 65,000 people were checked 
from the beginning of the operation in August 
until 24 December 2012, of whom only 4,128 
were arrested because they were found to be 
illegally staying in the country. The Operation 
was heavily criticised by the European Council 
for Refugees and Exiles for the risks it entailed 
for asylum seekers. 
Taking into account the thousands of police 
officers initially deployed and the hours spent 
to operate these round ups and subsequent 
controls, a sweeping operation to eventually 
shrink the irregular migrant population does not 
appear to be a cost-effective policy tool. In 
2013, the apprehensions completed within the 
context of Operation Xenios Zeus represented 
only 3.2% of all apprehensions of irregular 
migrants in Greece. This kind of an operation 
might be effective in combatting criminality, as 
the Greek Police often underscores; however, in 
terms of irregular migration management it is 
not, as only 6% of the third country nationals 






More comprehensive and accurate data collection (to allow better evaluation of policies): If arrest is 
Greece's first pillar in securing the return of irregular migrants to their countries of origins, it is 
important that more accurate data are kept to monitor the final outcomes of its apprehension policies.  
Investment in forged documents identification (will cut down time during round up operations). Under 
the current scheme, in the course of a round up operations all migrants are gathered together, 
transferred to the headquarters and their documents are checked there. This is a time consuming and 
inefficient practice for both the people checked and the officers involved. Funds could be invested in 
forged documentation technology.  
Appropriate training of police officers involved in such operations: The authorities should invest in 
screening and linguistic training so that identification becomes faster. This would cut down on the time 
of the operation and save resources which could be spent elsewhere (eg. regular police duties to combat 
criminality). 
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Detention 
The systematic use of detention has been 
increasingly regarded as the most effective tool 
to secure the return of the arrested migrant to 
his/her home country. In the period 2008-2013, 
detention, the second pillar in Greece's 
migration policy, became Greece's flagship to 
manage irregular migrants once they have 
crossed the borders. 
Among the most radical changes were the 
introduction of indiscriminate and indefinite 
detention into the Greek legal order; at the 
same time, an unprecedented financial 
investment in improving and expanding 
detention facilities was undertaken. The 
External Borders Fund and European Return 
Fund were Greece's main sponsors within this 
new policy course, as the construction and 
running costs of most facilities were co-financed 
by the EU at a 75% rate. Nonetheless, detention 
has proven a particularly costly enterprise. 
Detention as Punishment  
From the perspective of the international 
human rights law, detaining an irregular migrant 
in the context of removal processes is 
considered a particularly harsh measure that is 
only exceptionally allowed and under very 
specific requirements. In line with this 
fundamental rule, Directive 2008/115/EC 
(Return Directive) lays down a particular 
restrictive framework when it comes to the use 
of detention in irregular migration policies. 
As Directive 2008/115/EC requires, the use of 
detention must be limited (as a last resort 
measure); it needs to be of the shortest time 
possible and can only be maintained as long as 
removal arrangements are in progress and in any 
case, it cannot exceed 18 months; the 
conditions must be appropriate – detained 
irregular migrants must be kept in specialised 
facilities and be treated in a humane and 
dignified manner. 
The Greek legislative framework on detention is 
very much in line with the EU common 
standards. There are currently three different 
regimes in place that regulate the detention of 
irregular migrants on the basis of the following 
categories: 
a. irregular migrants arrested upon entry 
into the Greek territory 
b. irregular migrants arrested within the 
interior of Greece, (this includes 
rejected asylum-seekers) 
c. asylum seekers 
There is however a significant divergence 
however between the letter of the law and its 
implementation.  
Throughout the period 2008-2013, the detention 
of irregular migrants was both widespread and 
marked by a growing trend to circumvent the 
maximum allowed period of detention. Greece 
was repeatedly convicted by the European Court 
of Human Rights both with regard to the 
conditions of detention and the abritrariness 
and automatic manner in which migrants were 
deprived of their liberty. Nonetheless, Greece 
upheld its detention policy. 
In 2013, the use of systematic and indefinite 
detention became also formally Greece's 
policy priority. 
  
“Our aim is that every  illegal migrant, unless the competent authorities decide that he is entitled to 
international protection, will be detained until he is returned to his home country.” 
 
A few months later the concept of indefinite 
detention was also formally introduced into the 
Greek legal order by a rather controversial 
advisory opinion of the Council of State.  
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The aim of this policy of indefinite and 
indiscriminate detention is two-fold: 
(1) to increase the return rate, in particular 
voluntary return among detained migrants 
(2) to discourage irregular arrivals in the long 
term. 
 
Assessing the Cost-Effectiveness of Detention 
According to the statistics of the last three (3) 
years, (revised Hellenic National Action Plan, 
2013:53) approximately one third of all migrants 
apprehended and with a return decision at 
hand, continued to reside in the country, 
without claiming asylum and without being 
subject to return procedures. It was believed 
that the prolongation and expansion of 
detention would increase the efficiency of 
returns and reduce this percentage of 
undocumented migrants who simply 
“disappeared”. 
From an economic perspective, effectiveness 
is not equivalent to 100% enforcement. For 
each law, there is an “optimal amount of 
enforcement” which depends on a series of 
variables: the cost of apprehension, the cost of 
carrying out the punishment (e.g. imprisonment 
is more costly compared to fines) and the 
response of the offender to the enforcement 
(deterrent effect of conviction). As Gary Becker, 
a famous criminologist, argued 40 years ago an 
optimal policy equilibrium requires that the 
costs entailed outbalance the social damages 
caused by the crime (e.g. loss of society's 
earnings). Deterrence along, is thus not a 
sufficient reason to counterbalance all other 
costs; and detention as such weighs heavily 
within the scale, because it is very costly and 
causes losses not only to the offender but to 
society as a whole. As a rule, milder 
punishments should therefore be preferred.  
Greece's indiscriminate detention policy has a 
low cost-effectiveness in several aspects. The 
average cost of detaining an irregular migrant in 
Greece is 16 euro per day. On the basis of the 
current capacity of pre-removal centres (4,985), 
detention costs Greece (and the EU) a minimum 
total of 28,713,600 EUR per year (excluding 
special holding facilities, police stations and 
border guard units). If we now take into account 
that the current aim is to create 7,000-7,500 
positions (Commission Staff Working Document 
on the Assessment of the Implementation of the 
Greek Action Plan, 2014:14), then the annual 
costs of implementing detention reaches 
43,200,000 EUR per year.  
This calculation shows that the current 
detention policy exceeds Greece's available 
annual budget, under the European Return Fund 
(In 2013, Greece's return policy (pre-removal 
centres and return operations) ran a total 
budget of 46 million euros including both EU 
funding and national resources). This means 
that Greece will have to secure funding from 
other sources, something which does not seem 
likely under the current circumstances. The 
construction and renovation of pre-removal 
centres has thus far cost 20 million euros. 
(Commission Staff Working Document, 2014:15). 
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Alternatives to Detention 
Screening and First Reception Centres 
The concept of Screening Centres is relatively 
new. It was introduced together with the 
concept of the First Reception Centres. 
Screening Centres are not detention centres 
within the strict sense of the word. They aim at 
carrying out identifications processes and 
establish the needs and status of a migrant. 
First Reception Centres aim at providing 
newcomers with first aid (food, medical aid, 
information); new arrivals stay for an average of 
12 days and in exceptional circumstances for 25 
days. Their purpose is to identify vulnerable 
categories, offer first assistance and care, 
information on asylum and act as the first point 
of reference for the irregular arrival to the 
country.  
There are currently two screening centers on 
the islands of Samos and Chios.  
 
Open Accommodation 
Open accommodation centres are currently 
primarily targeted at unaccompanied minors, 
families and vulnerable categories (victims of 
torture). Some facilities are also open to adult 
women and one of those may also shelter men. 
The pre-condition for tenants is however that 
they are registered asylum seekers and are in 
their majority they are run by NGOs.  
If we take as a test case the accommodation 
program of the NGO Praxis, it currently runs 
apartments that can host up to four people 
each. The total capacity is 130 persons. The 
average overall cost of hosting a person stands 
at 9-12 euro per day. Accommodation is of a 
temporary nature (6 months on average), as it 
aims at aiding the person find employment and 
private accommodation. At the same time, if 
required, the person may seek the assistance of 
social workers. The approach is holistic in the 
sense that it not only aids the person financially. 
The current overall capacity of such centres is 
in total 1,093 places, funded by EEA countries’ 
special grants, the European Refugee Fund and 
national resources. 
Thus a combination of first 
reception/screening and open or semi-open 
centres appears to offer equivalent or actually 
better value for money, is in line with national 
and European law, and certainly is more 
appropriate than detention for asylum-
seekers and vulnerable categories of irregular 
migrants. 





Screening of individual cases: it is unnecessary to detain indiscriminately the irregular migrants that the 
authorities come across, in order to implement an effective migration and asylum policy. Such an 
approach results in unnecessary expenditures. Asylum-seekers for instance, cannot be deported for as 
long as their claims are being examined; paying for their detention during this period is both costly and 
inhuman. There is an urgent need for invidualised screening of all apprehended irregular 
migrants/asylum seekers. Thus the capacity of first reception and screening centres should be 
increased. European funds should be directed to this as an important policy priority. 
Surveillance schemes alternative to detention: Pilot schemes have been tried in Belgium, Germany, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom but also Australia and the USA. While state authorities have been often 
reluctant to adopt such schemes, the overall assessment is positive. 
Caseworker scheme-Investment in early legal advice: irregular migrants, including asylum-seekers, 
often rely on false information provided by the smugglers. Early legal advice, preferably through 
personal contact with an assigned caseworker, can result in quicker and more durable decisions, 
resulting in overall savings  
Investment in language courses: In many EU Member States, teaching to an irregular migrant the 
national language is a priority. Not only does this cut down on the cost of translators, but it also speeds 
up the administrative procedure, as the migrant is able to communicate in the context of daily 
interactions.  
Greece could adopt such measures and seek the financial support of the European Asylum and the 
European Return Fund rather than mainly trageting the European Border fund’s assistance. 
 
Returns 
The most significant change in the period 2008-2013 was the investment by Greece in developing a 
return policy, a component of Greece's irregular migration control strategy which had been overlooked 
in previous years. At a legislative level, the transposition of the Returns Directive introduced into the 
Greek order the 'returns' procedure, as opposed to mere expulsion. At a policy level, the IOM assumed a 
pivotal role in aiding Greece clear it stock of irregular migrants.  
With the financial support of three different funding instruments (EEA Grants, Return Fund, and some 
support from the UK Border Agency) the IOM organised most of Greece's voluntary returns in the course 
of 2012-2013. Among the most controversial moves, was the involvement of the IOM in offering the 
option of voluntary return to detained migrants, supporting thus indirectly Greece's indefinite detention 
policy; a move that did not meet with much sympathy by civil society organisations. 
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Readmission, Expulsion and Voluntary Returns 
The Greek legal system currently foresees three 
ways in which a migrant may be removed from 
the country: 
(a) 'immediate return', applicable to irregular 
migrants seeking to cross the borders (art. 83, 
par. 2, law 3386/2005) 
(b) expulsion procedure, applicable to irregular 
migrants arrested upon entering the country 
(art. 76-83, law 3386/2005) 
(c) return process, applicable to irregular 
migrants who reside in the country irregularly 
The physical removal of an irregular migrant, 
may be carried out in four ways: 
(a) readmission 
(b) forced return 
(c) voluntary return 
(d) assisted voluntary return. 
Direct outputs and direct costs of Return Procedures  
In terms of direct outputs, all removals of third country nationals in the period 2008-2013 are 
summarized as follows:  
Table 3: Readmissions-Returns 2008-2013 
Year Apprehensions Readmissions Returns (voluntary 
and forced) 
Percentage of apprehended migrants 
removed 
2008 146,337 48,252 22,703 48% 
2009 126,145 43,085 21,655 51.3% 
2010 132,524 35,129 19,100 40.9% 
2011 99,368 5,922 13,253 19.2% 
2012 76,878 4,759 20,473 32.8% 
2013 43,002 7,533 16,490 55.8% 
TOTAL 624,254 144,680 113,674 41.3% 
 
Source: Data provided by the Greek Police, 24 June 2014 
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Table 4: Forced and Voluntary Returns 2008-2013 
Year Expulsions Voluntary/Assisted 
Voluntary Returns 
Annual Returns 
(voluntary and forced) 
2008 20,555 -- 22,703 
2009 20,342 -- 21,655 
2010 17,340 337 19,100 
2011 8,741  2,607 13,253 
2012 6,798 11,526 20,473 
2013 8,780 9,962 16,490 
TOTAL 82,556 24,432 113,674 
 
Source: Data provided by the Greek Police, 1 April 2014 and 24 June 2014 
 
 
The most common nationalities in terms of 
voluntary returns operated under the IOM were 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan Iraq and 
Morocco.  
In absolute numbers, in the period 2012-2013, 
when all types of removal processes were 
operative, a total of 68,340 migrants were in 
some way removed from the Greek territory 
(50,216 returns, 18,214 readmissions). Nearly 
one fourth (26%) of all irregular migrants were 
removed via the readmission procedure. 
During the period 2008-2013, voluntary returns 
accounted for 47% of all returned third country 
nationals, against 53% of forced returns. In the 
period 2012-2013 however the share of 
voluntary returns has increased to 58% of the 
total. This signals a positive trend where 
voluntary returns are prioritised and acquire 
more effectiveness.  
Assessing the Cost-effectiveness of Different Types of Return  
In terms of cost-effectiveness, the available 
data indicate that forced return via charter 
flight is the most expensive type of return, 
both in terms of cost and in terms of human 
resources deployed; voluntary returns are in 
general less costly and bureaucratically easier 
to carry out.  
It is also reasonable to assume however, that 
voluntary returns are more cost-effective in 
the long run, since they invest in the 
integration of the migrant in his/her home 
society. The migrant thus has fewer incentives 
to return compared to persons who were 
forcibly returned. 
 





Distribution of funding towards voluntary returns: There is space for further allocation of funding in the 
context of voluntary returns. For instance, in 2010, voluntary returns were equivalent to only 35% of the 
overall budget under the European Return Fund. The available data lead us to the conclusion that for 
every 1,000,000 set aside, a rough 1,000 migrants can be voluntarily returned. If the authorities cut 
down on detention places, and instead increase the budget of voluntary and assisted voluntary returns, 
they may achieve more cost-effective results both in terms of time-frame and the available budget. In 
view of the Greek crisis and the difficulty in finding employment in Greece, migrants may be more 
willing to make use of this option.  
Expansion of return counseling programs: Information about return programs should be wider 
disseminated. Studies show that specific categories of persons (e.g. families with children) are more 
likely to agree to voluntarily return.  
Expansion of assisted voluntary return programs: The data provided by IOM demonstrate that 
integration schemes are very limited and that assisted voluntary return programs prioritise 
nationalities from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Iraq and Morocco. However, it would be more 
effective to open the program of assisted voluntary returns to migrants who enter Greece for pure 
economic reasons and expand the reintegration schemes.  
Seasonal work agreements: Greek authorities may consider not only the option of bilateral agreements 
to secure the readmission, but also bilateral agreements of seasonal work. The idea then would be that 
these workers keep their residence outside the EU, but come every year for the same season. Greece has 
significant experience with such successful agreements with Egypt, Bulgaria and Albania. This would 
provide an economic incentive to countries of origin for cooperation in the field of readmission and 
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